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| 文件名称： | 公司治理机制与公平价格(英文).pdf |
| 所属大类： | 国外动态 |
| 行业分类： | S:公共管理与社会组织 |
| 生效日期： | 2006-01-01 00:00:00 |
| 文件星级： | ★★ |
| 文件字数： | 4231 |
| 文件页数： | 8 |
| 文件图表： | 0 |
| 资料语言： | 英文 |
| 文件大小： | 312KB |
| 文件简介： | 公司治理机制与公平价格 K.J. Martijn Cremers and Vinay B. Nair MARTIJN CREMERS Yale School of Management VINAY B. NAIR The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania [Abstract] We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10 - 15% only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. A similar portfolio created to capture the importance of internal governance generates annualized abnormal returns of 8%, though only in the presence of high vulnerability to takeovers. Further, we show that the complementary relation exists for firms with lower industry-adjusted leverage and is stronger for smaller firms. The complementary relation is confirmed using accounting measures of profitability. Using data on acquisitions, firm level Q's and accounting performance, we explore possible interpretations, providing preliminary evidence for a risk effect as well. ...... |
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